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Waiting eagerly for Part B.

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Absolutely naive commentator here, so supposed to be taken less seriously. I have had the privilège of reading this piece earlier and have expressed my concerns and felicitations about the piece. My reaction here remains more or less the same, but I can perhaps add a pseudo quote about what I have come to conclude in past few days: the more powerful and the less powerful ought to learn to understand each others' concerns and to the extent it is possible, address at least some of these concerns, at leastsometimes. Does it happen very often more generally beyond the focal context? I am not sure! Does not happening so can still lead to any sustained "good", I am sure, not!

Personal quirk, I fear this might not be the right place but it is a bit related (very selflessly (selfishly) I hope you do not) get enough comments as so that you don't have (have) enough time to reply to this personal quirk): I am emotionally (definitely) and rationally (less so?) part of the sunni world that you briefly mentioned, so there you go me and my biases, and how I have been trained and have trained myself to think on these issue. I understood the other side of the story a bit better after reading the piece, thank you! I hope to learn a bit more by exposing my own biases: I wonder if you can talk a bit more about the likes of Edward Said essentially suggesting that the whites (west?) in their revealed preferences implicitly concieve us, the orientals, as a bit of joke (sometimes a good one and sometimes a bad one), we are relatively less serious people - less rational people - less thougtful - a bit lacking in things that matter.

Now I see where Edward Said might be coming from but I have been a target of this thinking within my own country on regional basis and see it happening to whole lot others (and me subconsciouly doing it to others perhaps), so the phenomenon kinda exists. But its less of something inherent to white/west that they see us orientals in this "less of a human" way. It's more that those who are at the top of the hill, economically, socially, militarily, etc. tend to do so about those a bit beneath them. In any case, to the extent such a behavior of inadvertantly seeing the orientals as less of a human plays a role in any way in the intractability of the issue?

The easiest answer is to turn it around and say well does arabs or moslems seeing jews with a similar eyes plays a role here. I think it does, at least to some degree. Yet, at the same time, do the morally superior (economically, socially, militarily) party to the issue sees it as such and if so, is it willing to consider it part of the problem. Why are all these questions important. I don't have cogent answer. As I mentioned at the start, its a personal quirk, and me trying to navigate some mix of biases and rationality that has prevailed in the past month.

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Great to hear from you, Yasir, & thx for reading the essay (again!) & offering these thoughts. I think the orientalist prejudice plays a role, probably making things worse. I just don’t know with much confidence how much. There’s also an interesting dynamic of orientalism within the (Israeli) Jewish community whereby mizrahi Jews are seen both as more authentic and as less agentic & competent. This is all pretty predictable given what we know about the construction of stereotypes (on which Oliver Hahl & I have papers). & it seems to be a microcosm of the larger tension between west & Middle East. I don’t think it’s the main driver though, in part because Middle Eastern Jews really are an important part of the Israeli social fabric ( Israeli Arabs to some degree too) & because Israeli Jews tend to get so genuinely excited whenever Arab states validate Israel’s legitimacy. I remember this well from when I was in Israel during Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem (the atmosphere in the country was electric-- never experienced anything like it since) or the enthusiasm for peace with the gulf states.

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Thank you for a clear response. Its interesting that you think it's less of an issue, or at least not a central issue. Speaking from personal experiences (and so problems of translating it from personal experiences to a presumably intractable macro issue remain), it seems like the biggest obstacle for me to have a fruitful conversation with another individual, to understand his or her position, and to cede to his or her rights and demands has been the inability to see the other as a full person, or conversely, the perception that the other person is failing to see me as full person, also leads to resistance from my side. I have extensively, and admittedly sometimes obsessively followed news media on the two sides during past several weeks of war. I think not seeing the other party as full beings was the central theme that struck me again and again. I guess this might not be news to those who are deeply embedded in these contexts, so I am not saying anything new. But it did make hopeless and sad, and of course, very angry on occasions. I wish things could be different.

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Sure thing Yasir. & thanks for this. I think it’s very common to think that the parties to a conflict (especially this one) don’t recognize each other’s humanity. I actually think that’s wrong in this case. See e.g., this paper: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103123001087?via%3Dihub. Shows they even respect each others’ religions as humanistic traditions! The problem, in my view, is the indivisibility of (claims on) land & the way the national narratives are constructed makes it extremely difficult to credibly commit to compromise. At least, that’s my view

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Thanks for this paper, will take a look!

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I found this article very helpful. Though I do agree with Boaz's criticism of there being multiple factions within each side.

I think there is a lot of core truth in the "competing narratives about the claims to the land" idea. For sure I (an Israeli) was raised with a standard "Israeli" view of things - there was never a Palestine, the land was largely desert before the Jews came, they rejected the plan and tried to attack Israel, etc.

I think I've gotten a lot more nuance on this now, as have most Israelis - the world has moved towards a more nuanced understanding of this kind of nuance. But the longer time goes on, the more the Palestinian position weakens, which is part of the goal of the Israeli right - Israel supposedly gained strategic strength all these years (though October 7th probably put an end to that line of thought). After all, Palestinians claiming they want to go back to a land that none of them were alive to be part of, that was 100 years ago, starts sounding unreasonable.

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Thx Edan! Appreciate that

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As promised on Twitter, here are some thoughts. I think there is some truth in what you are saying but some is over simplified. In particular the notion that there is "the Israelis" and "the Palestinians". I think in any national independence movement, the internal divisions are often as significant as the external ones. People that fight for an independent state also have strong opinions to how this state looks like, and even before beating their external enemy they also focus on their internal adversaries.

I don't know enough about the Palestinian divisions. But (despite being no expert on Zionism history) I know enough that within Zionism, there have been many distinct viewpoints that give rise to different nuances to the answers to your fantasy questions. (This is from memory - don't have time to look things up right now, so may get some details wrong below)

I believe there were/are four major strains of Zionist movements:

1) The pragmatist socialists a la Ben Gurion, that focused on changing as much as possible facts of the ground, saw the conflict in ethnic terms, and had little sentimentality to the biblical parts of Israel or appreciation for the the old Jewish community. Their view of territories was simply more focused on their economic or strategic significance than their religious one.

2) The communists (Meir Ya'ari and Moshe Sneh) who at least initially truly bought into Marxism and believed that the Jewish and Arab proletariat would unite together. Some stuck with Stalin till the end.

3) The revisionist (Zabotinsky) who were more traditional "right wing" and believed in military dominance. They rejected the partition plan and in fact for a long time argued that not just the west bank but also the east bank of the Jordan should be part of Israel.

4) The religious zionists (father Kook and later the son and followers) gradually began to see Zionism as not something to just accepted but in fact as a religious cause in itself, with the more extreme people seeing it a part of a fulfillment of a messianic prophecy that will end with the third temple being built. (There were of course also the non-zionist ultra-orthodox but most ultra-orthodox have now also embraced nationalism.)

The visions of what an Israel should look like are radically different. Is the ideal Israel a modern secular democratic state, where you can get great pork chops on a Friday night, but with the national holidays falling on different dates than in (say) Belgium? Or is Israel first and foremost a Jewish state, one where Judaism and religion pervades not just the symbolic domains but also the laws, judicial system, and day to day life. (Of course there is a spectrum of opinions ranging from no religious influence at all to a fully religiously controlled state a la Iran.)

At times of war (such as now) these factions often unite. The question of whether or not one cares about the territories doesn't matter when (rightly or wrongly) most Israelis perceive that there is no inclination for peace on the other side. But when war subsides then these tensions rise again.

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