Why Sociologists Should Vote Against the "Resolution for Justice in Palestine"
Well-intentioned efforts can do more harm than good, and this one does
Apparently, members of the American Sociological Association will soon be asked to vote on a “resolution for justice in Palestine” that was drafted by a group calling itself “Sociologists for Palestine.”
In this post, I1 try to make the case to my fellow sociologists (and interested readers) why, even though the resolution is undoubtedly well-intentioned (the laudable desire to minimize injustice, suffering, and loss of life), it would be a major mistake for sociologists to vote in favor of it. Indeed, if this resolution were to pass, it would serve to divide and alienate many members who are also deeply concerned with this conflict and its terrible, ongoing, toll. And future generations of sociologists would look back at this resolution with great regret.
Given the importance of the matters at hand, this post is long. So to cut to the chase, here is a rundown of eight substantive problems with the draft resolution:
In the context of the history of antisemitism and in the face of antisemitic incidents (on campuses and elsewhere) around the world in the wake of October 7th, the proposed resolution shamefully denies the reality of antisemitism by casting it solely as a weapon used to silence critics of Israel. This undermines sociology’s moral standing among Jews and anyone who experiences antisemitism as a real, ongoing problem.
By calling for a cease-fire without calling for the release of hostages, it denies the humanity of Israelis. It also denies Israelis’ humanity by ignoring the atrocities committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians.
By calling for a cease-fire without clarifying who the parties are that are meant to cease their fire or addressing why these parties aren’t holding their fire now, the resolution does not address the actual factors behind the ongoing violence.
In attributing agency only to the US and Israel and not to Palestinians, it exhibits a problematic form of Orientalism that lowers expectations for the moral capacity of Arabs, Muslims, and other non-Western peoples.
The proposed resolution fails to draw the appropriate lessons from the ASA’s silence in the face of better American analogies for the Israel-Hamas war than the Iraq War: the Gulf War, the war on the Taliban/Al Qaeda, and the war on ISIS.
Not only is its equation of Zionism with settler colonialism theoretically reductionist, but it also adds fuel to the conflict rather than helping to resolve it.
By calling out "Zionist occupation” while framing matters in terms of settler colonialism, it implicitly rejects Jewish self-determination and proposes that the ASA endorse the elimination of the state of Israel as a whole.
The proposed resolution’s call for disinvestment from defense and military (sic) corporations is irresponsible given the ongoing threats to the US and its allies from Russia, Iran, China, and other authoritarian powers that threaten the freedoms sociologists cherish and depend upon.
Below, I elaborate on each of the above eight substantive problems with the proposed resolution, each of which is sufficient on its own to provide a strong basis for rejecting the resolution; together they make an overwhelming case.
From Style to Substance
But before elaborating on these points, it’s helpful to first step back and consider the format and style of the resolution. When we do so, we find that even before we get into the substance of the proposed resolution, there is good reason to vote against it because it is both highly unfocused and politicized, such that it reflects the product of a homogenous “echo chamber” rather than a broad coalition.
The main reason2 I say this comes from a comparison of the proposed resolution with ASA’s 2003 resolution opposing the US invasion of Iraq. The 2003 resolution is relevant because it’s the only ASA resolution on record against a war3 and because the drafters of the proposed resolution cite it for inspiration. Here’s the text of the 2003 resolution:
When we compare the format and style of this 2003 resolution with the proposed one, we notice the following:
a) At 199 words, the Iraq War resolution is 36% the length of the proposed resolution (557 words)
b) The Iraq War resolution is much more focused than the proposed resolution. The former resolution provided two reasons to oppose that war (i. “foreign interventions that do not have the support of the world community” create more harm than good & ii. this particular invasion isn’t likely to reduce the threat of terrorism) and it concludes with a single resolution (the US and Britain should end the war). By contrast, the proposed resolution references several precedents and hot-button, highly divisive (even on the left side of America’s right-left divide) questions of cultural politics (on settler colonialism and antisemitism, in particular). And it concludes with three resolutions, one of which (disinvesting from defense and military) is given little or no justification in the body of the text.
c) While the Iraq War resolution acknowledges the rationale for that war (eliminating Saddam’s tyranny), the current resolution acknowledges no rationale for Israel’s war on Hamas or US support for this war.
In short, whereas the 2003 resolution seems designed to build as broad a coalition of support as possible, attempting to draw in even those who thought the Saddam regime needed to be dismantled as well as those who didn’t have a categorical objection to military intervention in the Middle East and elsewhere (i.e., mainstream liberals), the new resolution’s expansiveness and politics exhibit a disinterest in— arguably an antipathy towards— coalition-building.
Indeed, note what’s missing from the 2003 resolution. It too could have referenced politically divisive narratives and themes. If we recall the critiques of the war that one heard at that time from sociologists and others, the resolution could have framed the war as: a) an imperialist adventure; b) driven by oil industry interests; c) engineered by the military-industrial complex; d) an act of vengeance by the Bush family; and/or e) masterminded by neo-conservative ideologues. But it refrained from mentioning any of those critiques. And that enabled a much larger group of sociologists to feel comfortable voting for the resolution.
The advantage of this approach is that 21 years later, sociologists can look back at the resolution with pride regardless of how many of those critiques of the war we subscribed to then. But with the unfocused, politicized approach the proposed resolution takes, such an outcome is extremely unlikely.
And that’s before we even get to the substance— i.e., the eight points summarized above.
Let’s now elaborate on each of them.
Eight Substantive Problems
1. In the context of the history of antisemitism and in the face of antisemitic incidents (on campuses and elsewhere) around the world in the wake of October 7th, the proposed resolution shamefully denies the reality of antisemitism by casting it solely as a weapon used to silence critics of Israel. This undermines sociology’s moral standing among Jews and anyone who experiences antisemitism as a real, ongoing problem.
Let me be very blunt:
The proposed resolution’s treatment of antisemitism is shameful.
One way to express this point is to take the long view, as the proposed resolution suggests we should. Historically, the United States was a safe haven for Jews as it provided us with as much access to civil rights as we enjoyed anywhere else in the world (except, following World War II and the Holocaust, in the State of Israel once it was founded). My own ancestors arrived here as part of the massive wave of emigrants from Eastern Europe, which was triggered by Tsarist-sponsored massacres (“pogroms”) in the late 19th century. But antisemitism was hardly absent from American history. Consider Leo Frank. Google the name Henry Ford (far and away the most prominent American who wasn’t a politician of the early 20th century) and “the International Jew”); or google Father Coughlin or Charles Lindbergh. And in more recent years, google “antisemitic” along with David Duke or Louis Farrakhan or Pat Buchanan. And even more recently, “Brooklyn antisemitic attacks” or “Tree of Life massacre” or “Jersey City kosher supermarket.” Or, to take just one post-Oct 7 incident, you might google “Albany synagogue shooting.” I’d also recommend that you drive by a local synagogue on Saturday morning. You will see a concern with security that you won’t find at any other comparable institution in America. And if you still think we’re being paranoid, you might ponder FBI data showing that 50% of religion-based hate crimes are antisemitic even though we’re 2% of the US population.
Again, some historical context is useful. When I was a kid growing up in Providence, no shul or Temple had such security measures. Indeed, we were proud of the fact that whereas when we visited Europe we tended to see quite stringent security measures (you might think that after the destruction of European Jewry, Europeans would leave the tiny rump communities alone, but you’d sadly be wrong) we didn’t need these in America. Whereas any American Jew of my generation experienced antisemitism growing up (the main way I experienced it was via passing cars yelling slurs at us when we walked to shul, and there were some attacks by local kids), we heard stories from our parents about how it was worse for them; and we expected it to be better for our kids.
Unfortunately, it hasn’t been. And it’d be easy to make the case based on reported incidents and attitudes, that it’s recently gotten worse. And that was before Oct 7 and the rising question of whether some leftist anti-Israel and anti-Zionist activity is so extreme that it should be considered antisemitic. Here and here are two excellent reflections on this and related questions. And if you think antisemitism isn’t a real and growing problem on American college campuses, or that it’s only a problem on the right, check out political scientist Eitan Hersh’s excellent freshly-released study, about as high quality a (panel!) survey of college students you’ll find anywhere. And see Chad Alan Goldberg’s 2023 paper documenting and analyzing the recent “resurgence” of antisemitism in the United States.
With this history and context in mind, I want to take note of the fact that as far as I know, the ASA has never before issued a statement that referenced antisemitism. I’m not criticizing the ASA here; I’m not sure whether there was ever an obvious situation where this would have been appropriate. But it nonetheless seems to be the case (unless perhaps the ASA issued some kind of resolution during the Holocaust? Or perhaps, after the war, there was a statement on behalf of the imprisoned Jews of the Soviet Union? Or Romania? Or Syria?) that the proposed resolution would be the first time American sociologists have ever officially engaged with the topic of antisemitism.
And how do the drafters of the resolution propose that sociologists engage with it?
By referencing antisemitism solely as a cynical tool used by “pro-Israel” forces to shut down criticism of Israel.
Imagine now you’re a Jewish undergraduate who’s excited about sociology and you’re selecting your major. Or a graduate student in a sociology Ph.D. program, having fallen in love with sociology (as we all have) and deciding to devote themselves to becoming a sociologist. Or a Jewish colleague like myself who is strongly invested in the field of sociology. And now you see that the only time the ASA decides to address antisemitism— a force that you cannot help but recognize as real and threatening to you and your loved ones given its recent resurgence— it is presented solely as something that should be discounted.
Among the activities I have gotten involved in since October 7th is a regular lunch that includes students and faculty who identify with one or the other “side” of this awful conflict. At a recent lunch, a student from a Middle Eastern country offered the following observation (I paraphrase):
From what I have seen, people who hate Jews often attack Israel as a way of expressing that hatred. But also, pro-Israel people use allegations of antisemitism to shut down criticism of Israel
Unlike the drafters of the proposed resolution, this student is capable of holding two ideas (seemingly in tension with each other, but perfectly compatible) in his head: a) that antisemitism is a real problem and that it is the motivator for some of those expressing opposition to Israel (thus helping to poison political discourse about the war); and b) that defenders of the Israeli government use the allegation to shut down criticism of Israel (thus also helping to poison political discourse about the war).
The student’s observation was memorable not because it was novel, but because it was so obvious yet so rarely expressed. What exactly was preventing the drafters from expressing each of these two ideas? Not only would it have the benefit of being more factual, but it also would have expressed empathy for Jews who have very good reasons (given history and given the present) to feel insecure. If this student can acknowledge the reality of antisemitism (even among anti-Israel activists) while also acknowledging the reality that allegations of antisemitism are used to shut down criticism of Israel, why can’t the sociologists who drafted the resolution do so?
Honestly, I struggle to find any justification for this shameful approach. I resist the notion that the drafters of the resolution bear animus towards Jews. My guess is that their blindness reflects the fact that they reside in a bubble of like-minded people who are in denial that bigotry can exist even in their own political camp and even among the social groups on behalf of whom they seek justice. But regardless of the intent behind this approach, it is shameful nonetheless.
Just based on the draft resolution’s approach to antisemitism, it should be rejected by any sociologist who recognizes the reality of antisemitism and who seeks to avoid the resolution’s callousness towards the many Jews who have good reason to feel threatened by antisemitism.
2. By calling for a cease-fire without calling for the release of hostages, it denies the humanity of Israelis. It also denies Israelis’ humanity by ignoring the atrocities committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians. Such denials also fuel the conflict.
What is there to say about this other than that it’s simply a moral travesty on the part of the drafters of the proposed resolution? Just like the failure to acknowledge the reality of antisemitism, these absences are so glaring one has to wonder how they could possibly have thought that it was a good idea to leave these out.
What would they have lost had they had included a call for the hostages to be released? After all, they could have also called for Palestinian prisoners (especially those who are held without trial, under “administrative detention”) to be released. And what is gained by focusing only on Palestinian civilian casualties from Israel’s counterattack and saying nothing about the Hamas atrocities of October 7th? The drafters could easily have expressed sympathy for the victims of these atrocities while arguing that Israel’s counterattack was unjustified or that it was causing more harm than good. Why didn’t they do that?
Again, I’m at a total loss over these omissions. The only explanation I can come up with is that the drafters of this resolution regard Israel as so evil that they think that to acknowledge the humanity of Israelis (including non-Jews, apparently) is to support evil.
Can a majority of ASA members really support a resolution that omits any mention of the suffering of the victims of October 7th, and of the hostages taken that day (whom the UN just warned were at a high risk of ongoing sexual violence)?
As with the implicit denial of the reality of antisemitism, sociologists should be ashamed that 3% of its membership have already endorsed the omission of the Hamas atrocities and their mass kidnapping of civilians— let alone that a majority of the ASA membership might endorse this.
3. By calling for a cease-fire without clarifying who the parties are that are meant to cease their fire or addressing why these parties aren’t holding their fire now, the resolution does not address the actual factors behind the ongoing violence.
Here’s an obvious question you’d think any cease-fire resolution would resolve: Who is meant to cease their fire? The draft resolution leaves the matter hanging.
Clearly, one party that’s being called upon to cease its fire is Israel. But two parties are shooting at each other! As of the time of this writing (evening of March 10), 248 IDF soldiers have been killed in the ground campaign that began on October 23. Other than a few friendly fire incidents, these soldiers were all killed by militiamen from Hamas and allied terrorist groups (especially Palestinian Islamic Jihad). For there to be a cease-fire, they would have to stop shooting too, right? So why does Hamas go unmentioned?
Perhaps the drafters of the proposed resolution think it is obvious that if Israel stopped shooting, Hamas would too; and that indeed, this cease-fire would be “permanent.” But why would we think this? After all, there was a cease-fire in place on October 6th. Furthermore, even if we believe that the pre-October 7th Israeli-Egyptian blockade of Gaza was unjust and that it immiserated the lives of Gazans to the point that it was justifiable for Hamas to launch an attack on Israeli military installations, would you have recommended that Hamas go well beyond military targets and massacre, rape, and steal Israeli civilians in a mass-atrocity event of horrific proportions? And would you have recommended that they live-stream these atrocities or upload them to their victims’ social media pages, and otherwise adopt an ISIS-like media campaign to strike terror throughout the Israeli population?
No, right? You would have said that this was a morally indefensible plan and a major strategic mistake. You would’ve said that no amount of injustice or oppression could justify that kind of attack. And you would’ve said that such an attack would bring about a response that would lead to intolerable loss of life and a degree of suffering by Gazans that even they could not imagine.
But Hamas went ahead and committed these horrific crimes, knowing full well what was likely to happen. What's more, they were willing to do this because over the past decades, they had turned Gaza into an essentially impregnable, very well-provisioned, underground fortress, defended by the above-ground bodies of their fellow, starving Palestinians.
I know, I know— this is “hasbara'” (Israeli propaganda) right? But it also happens to be true. Consider the counterfactual: Imagine they didn’t have the tunnels and there were no civilians above ground. They’d never have launched the attack because they’d all have been sitting ducks to Israeli bombs, with no need even for a ground campaign. But because they have the tunnel infrastructure and because they’re willing to let Gazans suffer and die, they went ahead and launched their massacre.
And now let’s suppose Israel unilaterally ceases its fire. How do we think Hamas will respond?
It’s pretty straightforward. Since the Hamas leadership and thousands of Hamas fighters are still lying low, they’ll quickly reassert their tyranny over Gaza. And if you know anything about Hamas, you know that you would not wish your worst enemy to live under Hamas tyranny. (Hint: If Israelis are your worst enemy, consider the implications). But if Hamas remains in power, this is what we are wishing for Palestinians.
Oh, and by the way, there’s no good reason to think Hamas will abide by the cease-fire; rather, they will bide their time until they can attack Israel in the style of the October 7 “again and again”— they have said so explicitly! And if you think they don’t mean what they say or that they have learned their lesson about sticking with military targets, I don’t know what to say about your naivete.
The upshot: Once you start thinking about the problem as someone who has to live with the consequences, you realize that while removing Hamas from power is extremely hard, it’s the only way you’ll ever get a permanent cease-fire. (Hint: Israel has never attacked Gaza except when attacked from Gaza. You can look it up)
Does this mean that Israel has prosecuted this war well? Of course not. There’s plenty to criticize.
Does this mean that it is realistic for Israel to try and eliminate Hamas? Not necessarily. It may be impossible.
But even if eliminating Hamas is impossible, that unfortunately doesn’t mean it’s possible to get a permanent cease-fire without eliminating Hamas. All because we have a preferred outcome doesn’t mean it’s possible to achieve that outcome. And representing matters as if the outcome is achievable when it’s not, or that one party can bring about that outcome when a second party is essential, distorts the situation in a highly irresponsible manner.
A final note on this: As of the time of this writing, President Biden reports that Israel has made a “rational offer” to Hamas for a six-week cease-fire that among other things, would greatly increase the flow of humanitarian aid to Gazans But Hamas has rejected the offer. Why? Because the deal doesn’t ensure that they’ll be able to reassert power in Gaza. This just lays bare the dilemma that has been obvious from the get-go: A demand for a unilateral cease-fire by Israel— which is what the proposed resolution amounts to— is an endorsement of Hamas’s desire to resume their tyranny of Palestinians and terrorism of Israelis.
How can any sociologist endorse this?
4. In attributing agency only to the US and Israel and not to Palestinians, it exhibits a pernicious, leftist form of Orientalism that lowers expectations for the moral capacity of Arabs, Muslims, and other non-Western peoples
This point is a mix of style and substance. In short, and setting aside the specifics of the proposed resolution, it should make sociologists very uncomfortable insofar as it asks nothing whatsoever of anyone other than the US and Israel. Why are we not asking anything of Hamas? And why aren’t we asking anything of the Palestinian Authority?
Presumably, the drafters of the proposed resolution would say that the answer is that the US and Israel hold all the power and that Hamas and the PA have none. What’s more, Israeli PM Benjamin (“Bibi”) Netanyahu openly bragged about using divide-and-conquer tactics by building up Hamas to undermine the PA.
But if you take that logic to its logical conclusion, the implication is that the Palestinians have no agency at all. Here’s a key counterfactual to consider: The PA (the Fatah faction in particular) and Hamas could have resisted Israeli efforts to keep them apart and formed a unity government. They tried to do this several times over the last decade-plus since their civil war, but they failed each time. And in the meantime, each of the two governments has become more and more undemocratic and more and more corrupt.
If you were Palestinian, you would have reason to be angry at Israel for the various actions it has taken that made this sorry state of affairs more likely. But you would also have good reason to be angry at the failure of your political class. Anyone who knows anything about Hamas and the PA’s abysmal track record in governance knows there is a lot to be critical of. And anyone who talks to Palestinians knows that there is widespread skepticism about Hamas and the PA’s ability to provide good governance should they get the chance to run their own state. Certainly, Palestinians (at least those who are American and enjoy our freedom of speech) have no problem laying out the failures of Palestinian political leaders.
Such anger and skepticism reflect a different attitude than is reflected in the draft resolution— i.e., that Palestinian political leaders are agents who bear some responsibility for the fate of Palestinians. By contrast, the 2003 resolution did see Saddam as a (problematic) agent. Were his problems more glaring than Hamas’s? Not to anyone who is paying attention.
As for why the sociologists who drafted the resolution don’t cast Palestinians as agents, I can only speculate. My worry is that it reflects the new form of Orientalism I write about here, whereby (leftist) Westerners lower our expectations for the moral capacity of non-Westerners generally, and for Arabs and Muslims in particular. If true, the resolution would reflect a well-intentioned, but ultimately pernicious form of bigotry. Sociologists must hold everyone to the same, high, expectations for their moral capacity. the draft resolution strongly implies that we need not.
5. The proposed resolution fails to draw the appropriate lessons from the ASA’s silence in the face of better American analogies for the Israel-Hamas war than the Iraq War: the Gulf War, the war on the Taliban/Al Qaeda, and the war on ISIS.
Let’s resume comparing the proposed resolution with the 2003 resolution against the Iraq War, now with a focus on substance rather than style. In particular, let’s look at the first rationale it gives for opposing the Iraq War:
In emphasizing that the Iraq War did “not have the support of the world community,” it’s pretty obvious that the resolution is meant to distinguish the US/British 2003 campaign against Iraq from both the Gulf War of 1990/1991 (which involved a 39-country coalition) and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which was coordinated by NATO. Accordingly, the ASA issued no resolutions against these wars. And the invasion of Afghanistan— targeting Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that gave AQ a safe haven— is implicitly invoked by the 2003 resolution’s second clause:
Yep, the text of the 2003 resolution implicitly endorses the invasion of Afghanistan (perhaps a mistake, in retrospect; though arguably another good reason to object to the Iraq War was that it would undermine US efforts in Afghanistan). Note further that sociologists issued no resolution to protest the US’s campaign against ISIS launched by the Obama administration in 2014. That’s no surprise since everyone then was scared out of their minds about ISIS.
With this in mind, now consider why the US, Britain, France, and others supported Israel’s counterattack against Hamas after October 7th. It reminded them of Western military responses to jihadi terrorism that even sociologists endorsed (or at least quietly supported) when they occurred.
This of course doesn’t mean that the US and its allies were right to launch these wars. But especially since sociologists implicitly supported those wars and they even acknowledged the rationale behind the Iraq War, it’s quite strange isn’t it that the drafters of this resolution couldn’t bring themselves to recognize the rationale behind Israel’s attack on Hamas, if only to counter it?
I mean, imagine if Al Qaeda had committed 9/11 and then retreated right over the border shooting missiles at us and threatening to produce mass casualty attacks as soon as we let our guard down. Whatever imperial crimes one might attribute to the US as justification for Al Qaeda’s antipathy towards us, can you imagine the ASA issuing a resolution against an American counterattack without even acknowledging the rationale for it?
The upshot: The failure to even address why Israel invaded Gaza given that the ASA offered no objection to similar rationales for US responses to terrorism (and it recognized in its 2003 resolution the legitimacy of such a casus belli) exposes the proposed resolution as unserious grandstanding rather than a serious engagement with arguments for and against war.
6. Not only is its equation of Zionism with settler colonialism theoretically reductionist, but it also adds fuel to the conflict rather than helping to resolve it.
It’s become very fashionable in certain fields these days to equate Israel with Algeria. But anyone who carries the title sociologist should be wary of reductionism. And sometimes intellectual fashions are embarrassingly reductionist. Can a settler-colonialist framework be useful for analyzing the history of the Zionist movement, and of Israel since independence? Definitely yes, especially since 1967. But is it a good idea to only apply this framework and to ignore the other framework that scholars have long used to understand this conflict and which many prominent, insightful scholars continue to do— i.e., competition among two (religiously-inflected) nationalist movements?
No.
Why not? Two previous posts of mine address this in detail (see here and here), so I won’t belabor the points here. In short, the key thing to appreciate is that there are 7.2 million Israeli Jews and they don’t see themselves as settlers; more importantly, they don’t act like settlers. In particular; they act as if they love Israel and are willing to sacrifice their lives for it. Accordingly, rather than fleeing (as the pieds-noirs or the Rhodesian settlers largely did), Israeli Jews do the opposite: they return home and sign up in droves to fend off the attackers.
Of course, the fact that (Israeli) Jews act as if Israel is their national homeland does not mean that Palestinians don’t also act as if Palestine is their national homeland. They very much do. Just as the Israelis sing “I Have No Other Country“ (in the face of internal divisions as well as external threats), Palestinians rally one another with calls for sumud or steadfastness.
Indeed, what makes this conflict so difficult to solve is that it is between two nations that are equally committed to the same piece of territory. And if this weren’t bad enough, the conflict is perpetuated by two rejectionist convictions that have long been prevalent on each side: a) that only its claim to the land has merit and the other side’s claim is meritless; and b) that it is a ‘strong nation’ such that it can sustain the collective action necessary for a long-term conflict while the other side isn’t even a ‘real’ nation. As I’ve argued, it’s easy to see why it’s hard to arrive at a peaceful settlement when such rejectionist convictions are prevalent (and each side suspects that the other side is filled with rejectionists). And what makes the matter worse is that millions of third parties around the world encourage each side’s rejectionist convictions.
And that’s the role the drafters of this proposed resolution are angling for sociologists to play. In particular, if the ASA were to officially cast Palestinians as indigenous and the Israelis as settler colonials, it would not only be putting its imprimatur on a reductionist framework that misses crucial features of the relevant social dynamics, but it would be adding fuel to the conflict rather than helping to resolve it.
Why would we want to do that?
7. By calling out "Zionist occupation” while framing matters in terms of settler colonialism, it implicitly rejects Jewish self-determination and proposes that the ASA endorse the elimination of the state of Israel as a whole
The resolution concludes by referencing “Zionist occupation,” but why does the resolution use this language and what does it mean? The resolution could have referred to “Israeli occupation” and it could have been explicit about the territories Israel is occupying— i.e., those captured in the Six-Day War (other than the Sinai, which was returned to Egypt in exchange for peace). But instead, it refers to “Zionist occupation” without specifying what is being occupied.
One can only infer that this is a dog whistle to many on the left who have come to regard Zionism as an illegitimate settler-colonial movement (see above) such that even the state of Israel itself is illegitimate despite its foundation in international law. The attempts to delegitimize the state of Israel go way back of course, with a refusal to name Israel being a key rhetorical device in such delegitimation. Rejectionist Arab states and movements have long referred to Israel as the “Zionist entity.” By contrast, Arab states that have made peace with Israel— Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain— refer to Israel by its name. Moreover, they are clear as to the territory they regard as occupied. Heck, this is true for the PLO as well.
The language of the draft resolution thus seems to reject peace with Israel and endorse rejection of it. Why? Do sociologists have a problem with nation-states generally? All states that we deem to have been founded by settler colonialists? And if we do, when do we plan to do something about it? As far as I can tell, the vast majority of the world’s states are either nation-states or settler-colonialist states. Are sociologists calling for their dismantling? If not, how can sociologists endorse a resolution that includes such language?
8. The proposed resolution’s call for disinvestment from defense and military (sic) corporations is irresponsible given the ongoing threats to the US and its allies from Russia, Iran, China, and other authoritarian powers that threaten the freedoms sociologists cherish and depend upon.
It’s stating the obvious to note that the call for the ASA to disinvest from corporations linked to the defense industry is what we used to call “grandstanding” and is now called “virtue signaling.” Does the ASA even have assets? I sure hope they are minimal— so minimal that reallocation of our capital will not make a difference to Lockheed Martin.
Setting that aside, I’m curious whether the drafters of the resolution think the US should have a military and how it should be funded. After all, it is obvious that the US has made major mistakes in deploying its military power over recent decades (e.g., see above, under the Iraq War). But US military power has also been essential in the past (see under WWII) for preserving the civil liberties we cherish and wish for everyone around the world. This freedom also happens to be necessary for the work of sociology.
And if you look around the world, you can also see some really nasty regimes with a track record of terrorizing their own people and their neighbors. Every European today (at least anyone reasonable) is grateful for Ukrainians’ willingness to stand up to Russian tyranny. And every American should be angry at the GOP for kowtowing to Trump in denying Ukraine the arms it needs to keep up the fight.
Meanwhile, the drafters of this resolution propose that the US get out of the defense business. No doubt, sociologists should continue to dream Isaiah’s dream of “beat(ing) swords into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks.” And we should be as critical of the use of American military power as possible. But do sociologists truly believe that the US should unilaterally disarm in the face of the well-armed tyrants who stalk the world today? Go ask those re-arming Europeans, the Taiwanese, or the Syrian people whether they think it’s a good idea for the US to de-militarize. Since they’re on the front lines, they can’t help but take the matter seriously. I can’t think of why we wouldn’t take it just as seriously, unless perhaps because we are blinded by the safety provided by two vast oceans or our enjoyment of the fruits of settler-colonialism.
Conclusion
My fellow sociologists:
If you’ve read this far and you are still thinking you might vote in favor of this resolution, let me add one more thing to chew on:
America has tremendous potential to do good, but it is also in great jeopardy. The greatest threat we face today is the possibility that we might soon elect as president a dangerous demagogue who a) now knows how the federal government works; b) has demonstrated he has no respect for our Constitution generally and democratic processes in particular; and c) has been given a strong incentive (via the indictments) to weaponize the Department of Justice on behalf of his personal interests and against his enemies. The vast majority of sociologists, including the drafters of the proposed resolution, surely agree with me as to the great peril our republic is in. Indeed, the prospect of the failure of our republic emboldens authoritarians and tyrants throughout the world, thus imperiling the world more generally. Winter is coming.
Given that context, the last thing we need is resolutions like this one. It would be one thing if it truly resembled the Iraq War resolution— focused, built on consensual principles, acknowledging obvious rationales, and empathetic towards the suffering of all relevant parties. But it doesn’t resemble that resolution at all. It is flabby and highly politicized, while callously denying groups and views that are deserving of empathy and consideration. Indeed, it threatens to alienate people we will need to bring together to save our republic.
Why would we want to do that?
I am extremely grateful for the invaluable reactions and input of eleven cherished colleagues. Since a few are junior and the matters here are sensitive, I cannot name them. This is unfortunate because whatever you think of this post, it would have been much less effective without the time and wisdom that these colleagues shared with me. I alone of course am responsible for any remaining errors and infelicities. And I also apologize for the anxiety and ire that this post may cause; my intent is to shed light, not generate heat. I have disabled comments in part to avoid their turning into an incubator of such heat. I’m always more than happy to engage by email or (if civil, and truly dialogue-seeking) on Twitter, at @ewzucker.
There are other issues with the proposed resolution’s style. One important issue is that “permanent cease-fire” is an oxymoron in international law. Cease-fires are by definition temporary. It would be embarrassing for the ASA to endorse an oxymoron.
This is unsurprising since many sociologists likely support some version of the “Kalven Report” advocating institutional neutrality in the furtherance of academic freedom. For the relevant history and context, I highly recommend this lecture by my MIT colleague Malick Ghachem.